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Abstract
Foreign-dominated banking sectors, such as those prevalent in Central
and Eastern Europe, are susceptible to two major sources of systemic risk:
(i) linkages between local banks and (ii) linkages between a foreign mother
bank and its local subsidiary. Using a nonparametric method based on
extreme value theory, which accounts for fat-tail shocks, we analyze inter-
dependencies in downward risk in the banking sector of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia during 1994–2013. In contrast to the pre-
sumptions of the current regulatory policy of these countries, we find that
the risk of contagion from a foreign mother bank to its local subsidiary is
substantially smaller than the risk between two local banks.
JEL Classification: F23, F36, G01, G21
Keywords: systemic risk, extreme value theory,
financial stability, Central Eastern Europe,
banking, parent-subsidiary relationship
∗Corresponding author: Tomas Fiala, t.fiala@tilburguniversity.edu. We thank Mazen
Ali, University of Ulm; Lenka Habetinova, Tilburg University; Iftekhar Hasan, Fordham Univer-
sity; Roman Horvath, Charles University; Marek Rusnak, Czech National Bank; Boril Sopov,
Charles University; Mitja Stadje, Tilburg University; and Chen Zhou, Erasmus University in
Rotterdam, for their helpful comments. We are also greateful to Matej Senkarcin, University of
Pennsylvania, for his help with the data. The views expressed in the paper are ours and not
necessarily those of the Czech National Bank.
1 Introduction
In many emerging markets, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, a significant
portion of banks are owned by foreign multi-bank holdings. Until the global finan-
cial crisis of the late 2000s, the high level of foreign presence in the banking sector
of these countries was mostly viewed favorably: foreign owners were thought to
reduce the inefficiency of local banks, often state-owned in the past. These expec-
tations were corroborated by researchers examining the drivers of bank efficiency in
Central and Eastern Europe, who showed that foreign-owned bank outperformed
other local banks (for example, Bonin et al. 2005; Brissimis et al. 2008; Hasan and
Marton 2003). The positive view changed when the financial crisis spread from
developed to emerging markets, and regulators began to worry that mother banks
would drain liquidity from their local subsidiaries and began to consider foreign
ownership as a potential source of risk (see, for instance, CNB 2012; NBP 2011).
In contrast to the change in the perception of foreign ownership of local banks,
the research literature traditionally focuses on the positive effects of the ownership
of local banks by multi-bank holdings. For example, Ashcraft (2004) argues that
banks affiliated with multi-bank holdings are safer than stand-alone banks, because
the affiliated banks can receive capital injections in bad times and are thus able
to recover more quickly. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) suggest that foreign
ownership of banks can have counter-cyclical effects, since affiliates of foreign banks
do not have to reduce credit supply in times of financial crisis idiosyncratic to the
domestic economy. Goldberg et al. (2000) conclude that foreign ownership of banks
in Argentina and Mexico contributed to greater stability of the financial system
during crises in emerging markets.
In this paper we focus on the threat of contagion from foreign owners to lo-
cal banks in Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia). We compare these risks with those stemming from systemic interdepen-
dencies among individual banks in the local market. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to examine the transmission of risks from multi-bank holdings
in advanced countries to healthy local subsidiaries in emerging countries. We in-
vestigate these issues using stock market data and the methodology of Slijkerman
et al. (2013), which we adjust so that it can be employed to examine the relation-
ship between a foreign mother bank and a domestic subsidiary or the relationship
between banks in the domestic market. This non-parametric methods builds on ex-
treme value theory and accounts for fat-tailed distributed shocks, which constitute
a characteristic feature of financial markets.
We find that the threat of contagion between local banks and their foreign
owners is much weaker than the risk between the local banks themselves. The
estimated probability that a local bank fails after a failure of another bank in the
local market is 15%, while the probability of default of a bank is only 7% if the
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bank’s foreign owner crashes. Therefore, our results suggest that foreign ownership
does not substantially contribute to systemic risk in the local banking sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
economic rationale of our analysis, Section 3 explains the model based on extreme
value theory, Section 4 describes estimation methods and data, and Section 5 dis-
cusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides additional
simulation results, Appendix B provides confidence intervals around our central
estimates, Appendix C reports summary statistics of the data, and Appendix D
shows acronyms of bank names used in the paper.
2 Economic Background
In this section we elaborate on the economic relationships motivating our paper.
To be specific, we examine the linkages through which systemic breakdown can
spread. In the first subsection we describe how systemic risk stems from the
mutual similarity of banks’ balance sheets. In the second subsection we explain
how systemic failures can spread from a mother bank to its subsidiaries. These
relationships are then captured by the (joint) stock returns.
2.1 Subsidiary-to-subsidiary linkages
The linkages between subsidiaries can be explained by the mutual similarity of
banks’ balance sheets. As noted by de Vries (2005) and Slijkerman et al. (2013),
among others, banks’ balance sheets contain similar entries on both sides. The
similarity creates potential for a systemic breakdown, since banks face compara-
ble risks. The asset side of the balance sheets contains a wide range of similar
products or direct linkages. For example, mortgages or credit card debt are sub-
ject to the same type of risk, as the default rates are driven to a large extent by
macroeconomic conditions. Direct linkages then include large corporate loans or
government bonds. Large corporate loans tend to be syndicated; therefore, a de-
fault of a large corporate customer as well as that of a sovereign would lead to a
joint shock.
The liability sides of the banks’ balance sheets resemble each other even more.
Banks in the Central European countries are financed mostly by deposits. Thus,
they rely heavily on people’s trust in the banking sector; any abrupt disruption of
the trust could lead to systemic breakdown. Interest rates serve as another major
risk driver. Apart from these linkages, banks are also involved in mutual deals
on the interbank market. These interactions enter respective balance sheets two
times, since an asset of one bank is a liability to the other, and vice versa. The
interbank market therefore creates direct exposures between banks.
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2.2 Mother-to-subsidiary linkages
We derive the dependence between a mother bank and its subsidiary from mutual
interconnectedness of their balance sheets, which in turn usually stems from the
mother bank’s ownership rights. Nevertheless, these rights are limited by regula-
tors who impose restrictions to protect financial stability. We approach the issue
from the perspective of a subsidiary.
On the asset side the subsidiary is linked to its mother by both direct and
indirect exposures. The direct exposure is limited by the central bank or another
regulatory body. For example, the exposure of the five largest Czech banks to their
mother companies was about 60% of their regulatory capital (according to the
definition of Basel II) over the period of three years prior to 2012. In response, the
Czech National Bank has taken steps that imply a decrease in the gross exposure
limit from 100% of regulatory capital to 50% (CNB 2012).
Indirect exposures originate in the similarities of bank portfolios; that is, the ar-
gument from the previous subsection applies in the relation between foreign owners
and local banks as well. Even though the geographical area is different, banks still
hold similar assets like mortgages. Another example concerns Greek government
bonds which were held by banks across Europe; only the particular extent of in-
volvement differed. Further interconnections stem from the liability side of the
balance sheet. Most importantly, mother banks hold a controlling share in the
equity of subsidiaries, which enables them to pay themselves dividends when they
need to pile up their own capital. On the other hand, subsidiaries have to comply
with regulatory requirements like Basel Accords as well as local laws and decrees
which guard local financial stability.
As in the case of two subsidiaries, mothers and subsidiaries are linked together
indirectly via deposits in a way similar to what was discussed above, and also
directly via interbank markets. Concerning interbank markets, some mother banks
provide loans to their subsidiaries that are redeemable on a short notice. These
loans provide mothers with a quick access to liquidity, but at the same time they
pose a long-term liquidity threat for the subsidiaries.
3 Modelling Systemic Risk
The modeling of systemic risk is concerned with extreme shocks that endanger
the whole banking sector. This risk, however, originates at the level of individual
institutions that are usually linked via the interbank deposit market, mutual equity
holdings, and other linkages to be found in their portfolio holdings, like syndicated
loans (de Vries 2005). A systemic event in a narrow sense then happens when a
release of ‘bad news’ about a financial institution leads to considerable adverse
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effects on other financial institutions, e.g., to one or more crashes (de Bandt and
Hartmann 2000).
Therefore, researchers usually work with data on individual institutions and
dependences among them if they want to gain information on the possibility of
a systemic breakdown. Conclusions are subsequently drawn based on these two
pieces of information. Such an analysis is mostly conducted using methods based
on correlation—for example, Lehar (2005) or Acharya (2009)—which is closely
associated with the normal distribution.
As argued by Hartmann et al. (2004), crash correlation can be zero even if
there is a high spillover probability. This problem stems form the close link between
correlation and the assumption of normal distribution of returns. Under the normal
distribution assumption, correlation captures all the dependence between variables.
Generally, however, this is not true for the other distributions and only in the case
of a multivariate normal distribution it is permissible to interpret zero correlation
as implying independence (Embrechts et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, quite an extensive literature exists suggesting that asset returns
are characterized by distributions with heavier tails than normal; see, for example,
Cont (2001) and Ibragimov et al. (2011). We illustrate this fact in Figure 1a where
we plot asset returns of Komercni banka (KB), one of the largest Czech banks,
and its mother bank Societe Generale (SG). The returns stem from a time series
beginning on July 12, 2001, when KB was sold to SG, and ending on March 8,
2013, when the data was acquired, which gives us 2921 observations. In Figure 1b
we present a simulation consisting of the same number of realizations drawn from
a multivariate normal distribution using the means, variances and correlation as
it was estimated from the empirical data.
It is apparent that the simulation based on normal distribution does not exhibit
nearly as many extreme observations as the actual data do. The most extreme
losses in the simulation reach barely 10% in absolute value. In contrast, extremes
as large as 20% are observed in the data, meaning that normal distribution unam-
biguously underestimates day-to-day risks in reality. Note also there is a pattern
in returns between both of the firms. The returns are elongated along the axes of
the first and third quadrant; that is, returns of KB and SG seem to be moving in
tandem. This suggest that dependence between the two exists.
Finally, we note that we are primarily interested in the dependence between
downside risks, following Slijkerman et al. (2013). Correlation tries to capture
the overall dependence, and the large number of observations around the center
overweight the extreme ones. Nevertheless, in order to analyze systemic risk we
need to focus on contemporaneous extreme losses. An appropriate measure is
introduced in the following subsection.
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Figure 1: Empirical returns vs. simulated returns drawn from a multivari-
ate normal distribution.
3.1 Dependence beyond correlation
As discussed above, the techniques based on the normal distribution and the corre-
lation measure impose severe limitations on the modeling of dependencies. Since
risk management is concerned with modeling downside extreme movements, we
need a measure that is able to cope with distributions that exhibit heavier tails
than the normal distribution. This requirement also makes it impossible to employ
correlation which is closely linked to normal distribution and does not necessarily
capture the dependence between random variables in tails.
For these reasons we use the measure developed by Huang (1992), which sat-
isfies the stated requirements. It is a conditional expected value E(κ|κ ≥ 1) that
can be interpreted as the expected number of bank failures in the whole econ-
omy, given that one bank is already bankrupt. Suppose for simplicity that we are
dealing with a two-bank economy. The measure is then given by
E(κ|κ ≥ 1) = P (A > t) + P (B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t) . (1)
where κ stands for the number of simultaneous crashes; random variables A and B
represent negative stock returns, and t denotes a common bankruptcy threshold.1
1Note that the analysis can be extended so that it accounts for individual thresholds a and
b, see Hartmann et al. (2004).
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The measure was applied for the first time by Hartmann et al. (2004) to examine
linkages between stock and bond markets and has gained in popularity ever since.
For example, de Vries (2005) shows how the dependence is linked to the shape of the
underlying distribution. Similarly, Geluk et al. (2007) study the joint loss behavior
of correlated bank portfolios. Zhou (2010) uses the measure to show that economic
size should not be considered as a proxy of systemic importance. Hartmann et al.
(2010) then use it to study dependencies between exchange rates, and uncover
a higher joint connection of Western currencies to the dollar compared to other
currencies. Finally, Slijkerman et al. (2005) and (Slijkerman et al. 2013) employ
the measure to study the interdependence between the insurance and banking
sector.
The measure is popular because of its favorable properties. First of all, it is not
associated with any type of distribution, which allows us to account for fat-tail
returns. Second, the measure can allow for non-linear relationships (Hartmann
et al. 2004). Therefore, it can describe the dependency that correlation cannot
capture. Third, the measure can easily be extended into a higher dimension if
desirable. Fourth, as noted by de Vries (2005), researchers do not need to condition
the estimation on a specific bank failure. Finally, in a two-dimensional setting the
measure minus one can be interpreted as the conditional probability on a systemic
crisis, because it is equal to the probability that two bank crash, given that one is
already bankrupt.
E(κ|κ ≥ 1)− 1 = P (A > t,B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t) = P (κ = 2|κ ≥ 1). (2)
Due to this flexibility we employ the measure in our analysis.
Following Slijkerman et al. (2013), we define the systemic risk measure as the
limit of the expected value in equation (1)
SR(κ) := lim
t→∞
E(κ|κ ≥ 1) = lim
t→∞
P (A > t,B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t) + 1. (3)
3.2 Statistical model
This section builds on the approach developed by Slijkerman et al. (2005; 2013)
for modeling linkages between European banks and insurance companies. Never-
theless, we reshape their approach so that it can be used to model the relationship
between a foreign mother and a domestic subsidiary or the subsidiary-to-subsidiary
relationship.
We assume that the banking sector is subject to the three following risk com-
ponents: The banks have to face the global (macro) risk G, the risk related to an
individual country—here, we differentiate between home H and foreign F country
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risk—, and the bank-specific risk Xi. Finally, we also use the assumption that the
risk components follow the Pareto distribution, which is a relatively weak assump-
tion, since the distribution of returns seems to follow a power-law or Pareto-like
tail (Cont 2001).
Definition 3.1. Let α, xm ∈ R. Let X be a random variable defined on some
probability space (Ω,F , P ). We say that X follows the Pareto distribution, if the
probability that X is greater than a real number t is
P (X > t) =
(xm
t
)α
for t ≥ xm and 1 otherwise. The shape parameter α > 0 is the tail index deter-
mining the number of finite moments.
Thus, for a random vector (G,H, F,Xi) of the above-mentioned risk compo-
nents and for xm = 1, we can write
P (G > t) = P (H > t) = P (F > t) = P (Xi > t) = t
−α. (4)
Function F¯ (t) = P (X > t) is known as the survival function. We refer to a
survival function of a Pareto-distributed random variable as to the Pareto survival
function. We emphasize that in the set up of our approach where losses are modeled
as positive numbers the survival function needs to be interpreted as the probability
that a bank goes bankrupt once the threshold is surpassed.
Finally, we can define “the equity loss returns” (Slijkerman et al. 2013) Ai and
Bj for a domestic and foreign bank, respectively. Keeping in mind that both
Ai and Bj consist of three different risk components, we can write
Ai = G+H +Xi and Bj = G+ F +Xj (5)
where i 6= j, and where we keep the original assumption of our approach that the
weights of the individual components are equal to one.
3.2.1 Subsidiary-to-subsidiary dependence
Under this setting the risk profile of each bank Ai is composed of the same risk
components with the exception of the bank-specific factor Xi. Being interested
in computing the probability that Ai is greater than t, we need to compute the
probability that G+H+Xi is higher than t. To achieve that we need the corollary
formulated by Slijkerman et al. (2013) based on the Feller’s convolution theorem
(1971, p. 278).
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Corollary 3.1. Suppose that two independent random variables A and B follow
Pareto distribution with xm = 1, i.e., they satisfy
P (A > t) = P (B > t) = t−α.
Then their convolution satisfies
lim
t→∞
P (A+B > t)
2t−αL(t)
= 1 (6)
where L(t) is a slowly varying function and α > 0.
The corollary implies that for large failure levels t, the convolution of A and B
can be approximated by the sum of the marginal distributions of A and B.
For finite t we can, therefore, write
P (Ai > t) = P (G+H +Xi > t) = 3t
−α + o(t−α). (7)
Note also that P (Bj > t) would yield the same result.
At this point, we need to determine what the probability of a parallel crash in
the domestic banking sector is. This is given by the probability that two domestic
subsidiaries crash simultaneously. Thus, for k other than l the probability of a
simultaneous crash is given by
P (Ak > t,Al > t) = P (G+H +Xk > t,G+H +Xl > t). (8)
It follows that
lim
t→∞
P (G+H +Xk > t,G+H +Xl > t)
P (G+H > t)
= 1. (9)
The equation (9) already ensues that
P (Ak > t,Al > t) = P (G+H > t) + o(t
−α) = 2t−α + o(t−α). (10)
3.2.2 Mother-to-subsidiary dependence
In particular, we are interested in the relationship between a foreign mother and
its domestic subsidiary. This results in a slight difference in comparison to the
former case discussed above. The risk profile of the domestic subsidiary is still the
same G + H + Xk. On the other hand, the risk the foreign mother is facing is
somewhat different: G+ F +Xl. Being interested in the joint probability, we get
P (Ak > t,Bl > t) = P (G+H +Xk > t,G+ F +Xl > t) = t
−α + o(t−α). (11)
The reasons why it is the case are very similar to the previous case. The probability
mass is concentrated along the axes, but this time there is only one factor (global
risk G) that the two banks have in common. Therefore, their joint risk is driven
by this component only and the resulting joint probability is equivalent to the
probability that G is greater than t.
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3.2.3 Systemic risk
In this subsection we utilize the results we derived in equations (7), (10) and (11)
to compute the systemic risk measure SR(κ) from the equation (3).
Before proceeding further, we compute the future denominator of the measure.
Realizing that
1− P (X ≤ t, Y ≤ t) = P (X > t) + P (Y > t)− P (X > t, Y > t) (12)
for some random variables X and Y . Thus, we can write
1− P (Ak ≤ t, Al ≤ t) = P (Ak > t) + P (Al > t)− P (Ak > t,Al > t) (13)
for a pair of domestic banks Ak and Al. By using equations (7), (10), and (13) to
compute the systemic measure, we get
SR(κ) = lim
t→∞
P (Ak > t) + P (Al > t)
1− P (Ak ≤ t, Al ≤ t) =
3t−α + 3t−α
3t−α + 3t−α − 2t−α =
6
4
. (14)
This means that in a two-bank economy we expect that on average one and a half
bank fail, given that one is bankrupt. In other words, if one bank is already
bankrupt then the second one is expected to fail in one out of two cases. In the
framework of de Vries (2005) this result implies that the potential for the systemic
breakdown is strong, as the linkages do not vanish asymptotically.
Based on equation (12), we derive the denominator for the case of a foreign
mother Bl and domestic subsidiary Ak:
1− P (Ak ≤ t, Bl ≤ t) = P (Ak > t) + P (Bl > t)− P (Ak > t,Bl > t) (15)
Analogously, from the equations (7), (11), and (15) we compute the systemic
measure for the mother-to-subsidiary dependence
SR(κ) = lim
t→∞
P (Ak > t) + P (Bl > t)
1− P (Ak ≤ t, Bl ≤ t) =
3t−α + 3t−α
3t−α + 3t−α − t−α =
6
5
. (16)
The systemic measure suggests that the dependence between a foreign mother and
a domestic subsidiary is lower than that between two domestic subsidiaries. The
difference between the two cases stems form the varying country risk component.
This effect can be assigned to the diversification possibilities resulting from the
multinational structure. Although the systemic risk is somewhat lower, it does
not vanish completely. In the perspective of the de Vries’ system, there still exists
a strong potential for a systemic breakdown. As in Slijkerman et al. (2013), we
estimate the two models in the empirical section and test whether the difference
between the models is statistically significant.
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4 Estimation and Data
4.1 Estimation
In this subsection we introduce a non-parametric estimator for the linkage measure
in equation (1); we use the version presented in Slijkerman et al. (2013). Following
their work, we accompany the introduction of the estimator with sensitivity ex-
amples based on a simulation as well as on actual data (available in Appendix A).
The estimator of the measure in equation (1) is straightforward. It is sufficient
only to count the number of times when min [A,B] and max [A,B] are greater
than a threshold t. In this set up, A and B are empirical negative stock returns,
the joint co-movements of which approximate for systemic risk. The estimator is
therefore given as follows
̂E(κ|κ ≥ 1) = 1 +
∑n
i=1 1{min[ai,bi]>t}∑n
i=1 1{max[ai,bi]>t}
(17)
where 1x is to be understood as an indicator function which equals one whenever
the expression x holds and zero otherwise. The ith observations, denoted as ai
and bi, are realizations of random variables A and B, respectively. The number of
observations is given by n.
To understand where the minimum and maximum function comes from, one
needs to realize that:
P (A > t) + P (B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t) = 1 +
min [A,B] > t
max [A,B] > t
(18)
Nevertheless, we do not go deeper into the derivation of the estimator, because it
is already presented in Slijkerman et al. (2005).
The estimator described above has two favorable features. First, for a fixed
threshold t the estimator is asymptotically normally distributed as n → ∞. Sec-
ond, we can let t→∞ which stems from extreme value theory (Slijkerman et al.
2013).
For the construction of confidence intervals we use the Jackknife method. For
each estimated pair, we create twenty clusters of observations. Next, we drop one
cluster and estimate the linkage measure (17) each time; then we order the esti-
mates. The second-largest and second-smallest ones demarcate the 90% confidence
interval.
4.2 Data
We use daily stock prices of banks in the countries of the Visegrad group, namely
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. We focus primarily on banks
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that belong among the five largest in the country, are included in the local stock
market index, and have a foreign majority owner. The largest banks are chosen
according to the value of their assets as reported in the respective annual reports
in 2012. The mother bank is defined as holding at least 50% of shares in the local
bank. Our longest time series begins in January 1994 and ends in March 2013.
Nevertheless, some series are considerably shorter due to different dates of initial
public offerings and acquisitions. Following Slijkerman et al. (2013), we compute
daily loss returns. The data were downloaded from Bloomberg in March 2013.
Table 1: Analyzed banks and their mother companies.
Country Rank Bank Assets EUR bn. Mother bank
Czech Rep. 2 CS 35.1 Erste Group
Czech Rep. 3 KB 29.6 Societe Generale
Hungary 1 OTP 32.4 N/A
Hungary 9 FHB 2.6 N/A
Poland 2 PEO 32.8 UniCredit Group
Poland 3 BRE 22.1 Commerzbank
Poland 4 ING PL 15.6 ING Group NL
Poland 5 BZW 13.4 Santander
Slovakia 2 VUB 11.1 Intesa Sanpaolo
Slovakia 10 OTP SK 1.2 OTP Hungary
Due to the low availability of data in some cases we have to make a few excep-
tions to the selection rule described above. In the Czech Republic we also consider
Ceska sporitelna (CS), even though the company was delisted in August 2002,
after its sale to the Erste Group, Austria (EBS). Furthermore, we add two other
banks due to the lack of large listed banks. These banks are smaller; nevertheless,
we believe they are of systemic relevance, since their shares are included in the
local stock indices. In Slovakia we consider a local branch of OTP Bank as it is
a component of the Slovak stock index. In Hungary we include FHB Mortgage
Bank (FHB) into the sample, since it is a part of the base of the main stock index
of the Budapest Stock Exchange. Next, none of the listed Hungarian banks has
a foreign majority owner. Therefore in the case of Hungary we can only estimate
subsidiary-to-subsidiary dependence in downside risk.
Other caveats concerning data are worth mentioning. In Poland, BZW bank
was sold by Allied Irish Banks (AIB) as late as February 2, 2011 to Santander
(SAN). In our analysis, we examine only the relationship with AIB, since the
corresponding time series is roughly five times longer. We also realize that we only
have a few observations for the pair CS & EBS.
In Table 1 we summarize some basic information concerning the analyzed
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banks. In the end, due to data availability, we have two banks per country with
the exception of Poland, which is represented by four banks. We also report the
national rank of each bank according to the book asset value and the book asset
value itself. In the last column, we present the mothers of the given banks, where
‘N/A’ means that no one possesses more than 50% of shares. Summary statistics
of stock market data used in our analysis are available in Appendix C.
5 Results
We estimate the systemic risk measure (17) for the subsidiary-to-subsidiary and
mother-to-subsidiary dependence. Subsidiary-to-subsidiary dependence estimates
the downside risk dependence between two local banks in the country. Mother-to-
subsidiary dependence then involves a local bank and its foreign mother, defined as
a bank holding at least a 50% share in the subsidiary. Our results are summarized
in Table 2.
We conclude that systemic risk between banks in one country is higher than the
risk of contagion between a mother and its subsidiary, and these two sources of risk
are significantly different. The probability that the other bank fails given that one
is bankrupt then hoovers around 15% (in the case that a local bank crushes) and
7% (in the case that the foreign owner crushes), respectively. A detailed discussion
of our results follows in the next paragraphs. Further details are provided in Tables
3 and 5, confidence intervals are tabulated in Appendix B. Summary statistics of
individual time series data can be found in Table 8.
Table 2: SR(κ) averages for different levels of threshold t.
t=0.075 t=0.07 t=0.055 t=0.05
Avg, mother-to-subsidiary 1.0703 1.0637 1.0614 1.0647
Avg, subsidiary-to-subsidiary 1.1387 1.1699 1.1493 1.1496
For the estimation we use two levels of the threshold t. One is at 5.5% loss
return in a day, which reflects the level at which the estimator becomes stable,
as depicted in Figure 2b and Figure 3. The other threshold is at 7.5%, so that
our results can be compared with the study on the largest European banks and
insurers which are based in Western Europe (Slijkerman et al. 2013). We also
use additional values at 5% and 7% to evaluate the robustness of our results. We
emphasize that the model works with loss returns; that is, the losses are modeled
as positive numbers.
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5.1 Subsidiary-to-subsidiary estimates
We estimate the potential of contagion for all possible pairs for each country. Thus,
we have one estimate for the Czech Republic, six for Poland, and also one for Slo-
vakia. For completeness, we report the results also for the pair from Hungary. The
reason for only one available pair for some countries is the insufficient development
of stock markets in Central and Eastern Europe; indeed, the majority of banks in
respective countries are not listed. For listed banks we use the maximal possible
length of the respective time series.
Table 3: Subsidiary-to-subsidiary dependence.
Country Subs. Subs. SR(κ) Obs.
t=0.075 t=0.07 t=0.055 t=0.05
Czech R. CS KB 1.2308 1.2083 1.2500 1.2436 1744
Poland PEO BRE 1.1538 1.2143 1.1778 1.1739 3695
PEO ING PL 1.2258 1.2571 1.1486 1.1489 3696
PEO BZW 1.1333 1.1765 1.1731 1.1622 2947
BRE ING PL 1.1200 1.1852 1.1679 1.1686 4688
BRE BZW 1.1905 1.2174 1.1404 1.1410 2945
BZW ING PL 1.0556 1.1000 1.1364 1.1475 2947
Slovakia OTP VUB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0111 2049
Average 1.1387 1.1699 1.1493 1.1496
Hungary FHB OTP 1.1379 1.1389 1.1406 1.2069 2454
In Table 3 we present the estimates for all four levels of threshold t. We high-
light the stability of the measure with respect to the lower threshold. The averages
lie within a narrow range of only 0.0003. Even though we report SR(κ), which
denotes the expected conditional number of failures, we repeat that SR(κ) − 1
can be interpreted as the conditional probability of a crash given that one bank
goes bankrupt; the average probability reaches approximately 15%. Focusing on
individual pairs, we find the strongest dependence between CS & KB in the Czech
Republic, which exceeds 20% regardless of the threshold. The lowest systemic risk
is found for the Slovak banks VUB & OTP SK with the probability of an extra
crash equal to 0% for the first three levels of t.
In the terminology of de Vries (2005), the latter result implies that the potential
for systemic breakdown in Slovakia is weak, since the crash of one of the banks
is likely to remain isolated. We can also see that the threshold of 7.5% is for the
estimator in cases like BZW & ING PL too high to stabilize. This instability
means that the threshold is located at the beginning of the potential range, still in
the area of increased volatility. Decreasing the threshold stabilizes the estimator,
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which is apparent from Figure 3. Hungarian banks are excluded from the average
reported in the table for the sake of consistency. (They are also excluded from
the mother-to-subsidiary analysis, because none of them has a foreign majority
owner.) The last column in the Table 3 reports the number of observations.
5.2 Mother-to-subsidiary estimates
For each local bank we compute the dependence between the bank (subsidiary)
and its mother bank. We only use the data for the period after the subsidiary was
acquired by the foreign owner. The dates of acquisition are determined based on
annual reports and other official sources of information. For BZW, which changed
its mother in 2010, we consider the period when it was owned by AIB. An overview
of the dates of foreign acquisition is provided in Table 4. ‘N/A’ denotes that the
bank does not have a mother; this excludes Hungarian banks form the mother-to-
subsidiary analysis. Sources for the dates of acquisition are annual reports of the
corresponding local banks.
Table 4: Dates of acquisition of analysed banks.
Country Bank Acquired on
Czech Rep. CS 1.3.2000
Czech Rep. KB 12.7.2001
Slovakia VUB 21.11.2001
Slovakia OTP SK 4.4.2002
Poland PEO 3.8.1999
Poland BRE 17.10.2000
Poland ING PL 24.7.1996
Poland BZW 23.6.2001
Poland BZW 10.9.2010
Hungary OTP N/A
Hungary FHB N/A
The average probability that a bank fails, given that another has already
crashed, is roughly 7%. The number is relatively stable across different levels
of threshold t. Focusing on specific pairs of banks, we find the highest probability
of contagion for PEO & UCG at 13%, followed by SG & KB and CBK & BRE.
The weakest relationship concerns EBS & CS with estimate equal to zero, which
suggests weak potential for contagion. Nevertheless, the result is probably influ-
enced by the short data series available for the pair. The second lowest intensity
of potential contagion is found for OTP SK & OTP with the probability of only
2.5%. An overview of our results is available in Table 5.
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Table 5: Mother-to-subsidiary dependence.
Mother Subsidiary SR(κ) Obs.
t=0.075 t=0.07 t=0.055 t=0.05
EBS CS 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 589
SG KB 1.1282 1.1020 1.0645 1.1026 2921
UCG PEO 1.1389 1.1364 1.1395 1.1193 3401
CBK BRE 1.1154 1.1167 1.1028 1.1007 3087
ING ING PL 1.1094 1.0930 1.0979 1.0889 4148
AIB BZW 1.0380 1.0330 1.0467 1.0629 2504
ISP VUB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0233 1.0172 2572
OTP OTP SK 1.0323 1.0286 1.0161 1.0260 1973
Average 1.0703 1.0637 1.0614 1.0647
We test for systemic differences between contagion among local banks and
contagion from foreign owners to local banks using the non-parametric Wilcoxon
(1945) signed rank tests. The null hypothesis is that the mean difference as well as
median difference is zero; the alternative is that they are different from zero. We
reject the null hypothesis for all levels of t at the 10% significance level and for the
three lowest levels of t even at the 5% significance level. The resulting p-value of the
test is 0.0547, 0.0156, 0.0234, and 0.0156, respectively. We therefore conclude that
the difference between the two sources of risk is statistically significant. Should we
use the sign test (see, for example, King and Mody 2010), we would conclude that
the subsidiary-to-subsidiary and mother-to-subsidiary probabilities of contagion
are significantly different for all thresholds t at the 10% confidence level, since the
p-values are 0.0703 for all thresholds t.
We find that the potential for a systemic breakdown between a mother and its
subsidiary is on average approximately half compared to that between subsidiaries
within a country, and that the difference is statistically significant. The result
has two potential explanations. First, the finding can be attributed to successful
attempts of regulators to protect local banks under their jurisdiction from capital
and liquidity outflows. Second, the result suggests that investors perceive some
risks as specific to Central and Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, it is
unclear what proportion of this effect is attributable to regulatory policies and
what to country specific risks.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the interdependencies in downside risk between local
banks in Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia) and between local banks and their foreign owners. We find that the risk
of contagion is much stronger between local banks than between foreign parent
banks and their local subsidiaries. In the analysis we use a measure of systemic risk
which builds on extreme value theory. The measure is non-parametrical, which
allows us to account for potentially fat-tailed distribution of shocks in financial
markets, and also captures non-linear dependencies and enables us to focus on the
interdependencies between large losses of local and foreign banks.
Our results suggest that the probability that a default of a local bank causes
a default of another local bank is about 15%. In contrast, contagion from foreign
owners is much less pronounced: a default of a foreign owner bank leads to the
default of its local subsidiary with the probability of only 7%. Therefore, our
analysis suggests that the worries of regulators in Central and Eastern Europe
concerning the danger of increased systemic risk due to high foreign ownership
of local banks might be exaggerated. In contrast, integration of local banks into
multi-bank holdings may help alleviate systemic risk.
The contribution of our analysis in comparison with previous research is three-
fold. First, our paper is the first to focus on the relationship between foreign
mother banks and their local subsidiaries and compare contagion risks from ailing
mothers to healthy daughters with the relationships between individual banks in
the local market. Second, few studies have analyzed systemic risk in Central and
Eastern Europe (the rare examples include, for instance, Arvai et al. 2009; Cihak
et al. 2007). Third, we employ modern techniques well-suited for the examination
of interdependencies in downside risk between banks (Slijkerman et al. 2013). The
main limitation of our analysis is the reliance on stock returns, because some stock
markets in Central and Eastern Europe are not particularly liquid (especially the
Slovakian stock exchange). On the other hand, stocks of the large banks that we
select for our analysis typically rank among the most traded ones at the individual
stock exchanges.
Our results also point to much weaker co-movement of extreme losses in stock
prices between a local bank and its foreign owner than between local banks. This
finding seems to contrast with a relatively large literature on stock market co-
movements in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Horvath and Petrovski
(2013) conclude that stock markets in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
are heavily correlated with those in Western Europe. Gjika and Horvath (2013)
report a high level of market integration between the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland and the euro area. The analysis of Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011)
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shows similar results. Our findings are different because we use a more flexible,
non-parametric method that focuses on large outlying shocks in financial markets.
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A Additional Simulation and Example
To illustrate how the estimator is sensitive to the choice of the threshold, we run
a simulation. We draw 2921 realizations—which equals the number of observed
returns between SG (Societe Generale) and KB (Komercni banka)—from the bi-
variate normal and student t distributions with three degrees of freedom. The
realizations are rescaled so that the means, variances, and correlations are the
same as what is observed for actual data on SG and KB.
Figure 2: Simulated conditional number of failures (minus one) drawn
from a bivariate normal and student t distributions.
We compute the ratio of the times when the minimum and maximum of the two
variables exceeds the threshold t. From equation (17) we know that this number
is actually the conditional number of failures minus one:
̂E(κ|κ ≥ 1)− 1 =
∑n
i=1 1{min[ai,bi]>t}∑n
i=1 1{max[ai,bi]>t}
In Figure 2 this number is depicted on the y axis.
On the x axis, various boundaries (related, but not equivalent to the thresh-
old t) are depicted, and the numbers denote the position of the threshold; the
thresholds are taken from the order statistics. For example, a value of 100 on the
x axis means that the threshold t is equal to the 100th highest order statistic, a
value of 200 then represents a threshold equal to the 200th highest order statistic.
As the value on the x axis increases, the threshold t decreases and the number of
threshold violations increases as well.
20
This observation also implies that for x = 2921 it holds that ̂E(κ|κ ≥ 1)− 1 = 1,
because the threshold is then at its lowest and t is equal to the lowest order statis-
tic. Nevertheless, as Slijkerman et al. (2013) point out, “this is not a relevant area,
since SR(κ) = limt→∞E(κ|κ ≥ 1) should be judged from using a low number of
order statistics only.” Therefore, we present only the 700 highest order statis-
tics whereby 700 is somewhat lower than 750 employed by Slijkerman et al. and
corresponds to the lower number of realizations in our case.
Finally, we comment on Figure 2. In part (a) of the figure we show the results
drawn from the normal distribution. In the beginning the value is zero, since
no realization was extreme enough to surpass the first fifty thresholds. As the
threshold is gradually decreased, more and more observations exceed the given
threshold.
Figure 3: Conditional number of failures (minus one) estimated from the
returns of SG and KB.
The result of the simulation based on the student t distribution is depicted in
part (b) of the figure. We can see that the estimator is very volatile at the begin-
ning, because only a few observations exceed the threshold level min [ai, bi] > t.
The value of the estimator therefore changes with every additional realization
above that level. As the threshold decreases, the estimator stabilizes around 0.2.
This means that if bank returns followed a student t distribution, we could ex-
pect that the other bank crashes once out of five times. It is worth noting that
Slijkerman et al. (2013) also ended up with the value of approximately 0.2 in his
estimation.
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Furthermore, we investigate the behavior of the estimator using SG and KB
returns; that is, the same data as in the beginning of Chapter 3. We present
our results in Figure 3; the axes denote the same values as in the previous case.
Resembling the case of simulated student t series, the estimator is unstable at the
beginning before it stabilizes approximately at 0.2. Furthermore, it is clearly visible
that the initial instability stems from the low number of threshold violations. As
the number of threshold violations increases, the estimator stabilizes.
B Confidence Intervals
This appendix accompanies the empirical analysis in Section 5. In particular, it
provides 90% confidence intervals for the estimates in Tables 3 and 5. ‘L’ denotes
the lower bound of the interval, ‘E’ is the estimate and ‘U’ denotes the upper
bound.
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Table 6: Mother-to-subsidiary dependence. Estimates, and 90% confi-
dence interval lower and upper bounds.
Subsidiary Mother SR(κ)
t=0.075 t=0.07 t=0.055 t=0.05
CS EBS L 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
E 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
U 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
KB SG L 1.1282 1.1000 1.0513 1.1019
E 1.1282 1.1020 1.0645 1.1026
U 1.1389 1.1111 1.0698 1.1101
PEO UCB L 1.1389 1.1212 1.1053 1.0769
E 1.1389 1.1364 1.1395 1.1193
U 1.1515 1.1463 1.1481 1.1275
BRE CBK L 1.1064 1.0909 1.0824 1.0870
E 1.1154 1.1167 1.1028 1.1007
U 1.1224 1.1273 1.1100 1.1091
ING PL ING L 1.0984 1.0875 1.0794 1.0759
E 1.1094 1.0930 1.0979 1.0889
U 1.1167 1.0988 1.1037 1.0943
BZW AIB L 1.0380 1.0330 1.0405 1.0577
E 1.0380 1.0330 1.0467 1.0629
U 1.0429 1.0375 1.0534 1.0688
VUB ISP L 1.0000 1.0000 1.0130 1.0094
E 1.0000 1.0000 1.0233 1.0172
U 1.0000 1.0000 1.0267 1.0196
OTP SK OTP L 1.0323 1.0286 1.0161 1.0156
E 1.0323 1.0286 1.0161 1.0260
U 1.0357 1.0313 1.0179 1.0282
CS&RBAG EBS L 1.1613 1.1714 1.2301 1.2283
E 1.1719 1.1867 1.2458 1.2411
U 1.1930 1.2154 1.2727 1.2689
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Table 7: Subsidiary-to-subsidiary dependence. Estimates, and 90% confi-
dence interval lower and upper bounds.
Country Subs. Subs. SR(κ)
t=0.075 t=0.07 t=0.055 t=0.05
Czech R. CS KB L 1.2105 1.1957 1.2157 1.2206
E 1.2308 1.2083 1.2500 1.2436
U 1.2500 1.2273 1.2778 1.2639
Poland PEO BRE L 1.1250 1.1875 1.1594 1.1553
E 1.1538 1.2143 1.1778 1.1739
U 1.1667 1.2250 1.1905 1.1835
PEO ING PL L 1.2069 1.2258 1.1385 1.1325
E 1.2258 1.2571 1.1486 1.1489
U 1.2414 1.2727 1.1618 1.1591
PEO BZW L 1.1333 1.1765 1.1667 1.1594
E 1.1333 1.1765 1.1731 1.1622
U 1.1429 1.1875 1.1875 1.1739
BRE ING PL L 1.1127 1.1711 1.1453 1.1497
E 1.1200 1.1852 1.1679 1.1686
U 1.1250 1.1923 1.1756 1.1779
BRE BZW L 1.1905 1.2174 1.1346 1.1370
E 1.1905 1.2174 1.1404 1.1410
U 1.2105 1.2381 1.1538 1.1528
BZW ING PL L 1.0556 1.1000 1.1190 1.1379
E 1.0556 1.1000 1.1364 1.1475
U 1.0625 1.1111 1.1463 1.1607
Slovakia OTP VUB L 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0111
E 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0111
U 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0122
Hungary FHB OTP L 1.1200 1.1290 1.1270 1.1905
E 1.1379 1.1389 1.1406 1.2069
U 1.1481 1.1471 1.1500 1.2143
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C Summary Statistics
The summary statistics reported in Table 8 display the key characteristics of con-
tinuously compounded loss return series for the banks in our sample. The highest
loss incurred, equal to 71%, occurred in the case of OTP SK. Such a high number
is to some extent a result of continuous compounding. We checked the original
data containing prices; indeed, the price of OTP SK dropped between July 29,
1998 and August 14, 1998 from 5.643 EUR down to 1.992 EUR. More surprisingly,
these two prices are neighboring observations. We believe that this break can be
attributed to the specifics of a transition economy and low liquidity of the Slo-
vakian stock exchange. If we dropped this observation, however, results would not
change significantly. Other extreme losses are 44% in the case of AIB and 32% for
ING.
Table 8: Individual loss return series, continuous compounding.
Bank Mean St. Dev. Min Max
CS -0.0004 0.0271 -0.1886 0.2753
EBS -0.0003 0.0234 -0.1703 0.2000
KB -0.0002 0.0230 -0.2005 0.2409
SG -0.0003 0.0227 -0.2033 0.1771
PEO 0.0001 0.0214 -0.1356 0.2059
UCG 0.0000 0.0222 -0.1755 0.1895
BRE -0.0002 0.0237 -0.1290 0.1415
CBK 0.0002 0.0234 -0.2048 0.1640
ING PL -0.0002 0.0206 -0.0953 0.1165
ING 0.0000 0.0233 -0.1925 0.3214
BZW -0.0003 0.0195 -0.1103 0.1214
SAN -0.0002 0.0193 -0.1339 0.1955
AIB 0.0005 0.0323 -0.3610 0.4383
VUB -0.0007 0.0226 -0.1086 0.2757
ISP -0.0002 0.0216 -0.1614 0.1846
OTP SK 0.0008 0.0345 -0.4984 0.7129
OTP -0.0005 0.0247 -0.2092 0.2513
FHB 0.0001 0.0213 -0.2089 0.1972
The most extreme gain reaches 50% in the case of OTP SK, but again, there
is a break of almost two months in trading. The other maxima include 36% for
AIB and 21% for OTP. Combined with an average mean of -0.01% and average
standard deviation of 2.37%, these numbers virtually eliminates the possibility
that the loss returns are normally distributed, which we discuss in Section 3.
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D Acronyms of Bank Names
AIB Allied Irish Banks
BRE Bre Bank Group
BZW Bank Zachodni WBK
CBK Commerzbank
CS Ceska sporitelna
CSOB Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka
EBS Erste Group
FHB FHB Mortgage Bank
ING ING Group
ING PL ING Bank Slaski
ISP Intesa SanPaolo
KB Komercni banka
OTP OTP Bank, Hungary
OTP SK OTP Bank, Slovakia
PEO Bank Pekao
PKO PKO Bank Polski
SAN Banco Santander
SG Societe Generale
UCG UniCredit Group
VUB Vseobecna uverova banka
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